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The Manipulation of Indigenous
Status: The Federal Government as
Shape-Shifter
by
David Wilkins
The federal-Indian
relationship ... is like no
other in the world. Indian
tribes are denominated
"domestic-dependent
nations" but their practical
relationship with the
United States "resembles
that of a ward to his
guardian." Indian tribes
appear to have the same
political status as the
independent states of San
Marino, Monaco, and
Liechtenstein, yet they
have little real self-
government and seem to be
forever mired in a state of
political and economic pupilage.1
Indigenous p
collective bo
individua
frequently le
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ambiva
understandin
political,
culturalr
This fifteen-year-old statement from Vine Deloria,
Jr., the preeminent Indian political and legal scholar, still
accurately reflects the convoluted nature of indigenous
political, legal, and economic statuses in the United
States. The multiple, overlapping, and sometimes
seemingly irreconcilable manifestations of indigenous
status in federal law and policy arise in Supreme Court
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cases, congressional statutes,
eoples as treaties, agreements, and
administrative regulations. These
dies and various statuses have multiplied and
expanded in unusual directions, but
Is are they trace their lineage under United
with an States law to the early moments of
the American Republic's existence.
ve and Variations on indigenous status,
however, date back to Columbus'
tent conflicting commentary on Indian
o th eir and Spanish theological debates
about whether or not Indians were
gal, and by nature free persons or slaves.
Because of a variety of factors,
ights. the once holistic political, legal, and
cultural status of indigenous nations
and individuals has changed over
time in entirely unpredictable and ad hoc ways. Tribes as
collective bodies have received an inherent racial,
cultural, and national status. United States law first
accorded them a dependent, ward-like status and later a
corporate one. Tribes have been alternately treated as
"discrete and insular" minority communities and as local
governments or sub-units of government. They have also
been viewed as social service agencies due to poverty in
their demographic bodies. United States law has
regarded tribes as "delegated" bodies for purposes of
carrying out federal mandates. Tribes have been
statutorily treated as "states" for some programmatic
purposes, while at other times treated as collective bodies.
Indians as individuals have a recognized status as
tribal, cultural, and political citizens eligible for
distinctive property rights (such as hunting and fishing)
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and tax exemptions. Although not initially granted state
and federal citizenship, they now hold that standing and
are entitled to the services and benefits (social security,
unemployment compensation, and welfare) open to every
American. Because of their "Indian" status, however,
individuals are treated as "subjects" under federal law,
because the federal government can abrogate or diminish
their rights notwithstanding their sovereign and citizen
status. This "subject" status is largely due to
congressional plenary power, and it affects Indians and
tribes through liquor use regulations, criminal penalties,
religious rights, aboriginal Indian title to lands, and treaty
adherence. As a result of these multiple inherent,
assumed, and imposed statuses, indigenous peoples as
collective bodies and individuals are frequently left with
an inconclusive and ambivalent understanding of their
political, legal, and cultural rights and their actual status
vis-a-vis the states and the federal government.
In short, the federal government has an indeterminate
relationship with tribal nations and their members:
sometimes recognizing and supporting tribal sovereignty,
and sometimes acting to deny, diminish, or even terminate
that sovereign status. On the one hand, such
indeterminacy accords imaginative tribal leaders, United
States presidents and their executive agents, federal
judges, congressional lawmakers, and state officials a
degree of political and legal flexibility. Involved parties
may successfully navigate otherwise difficult political
terrain by choosing appropriate indigenous statuses that
can benefit tribal nations and/or individual Indians. On
the other hand, such ambivalence deprives aboriginal
peoples, collectively and singly, of a clear and consistent
understanding or the powers and rights they may be
capable of exercising, thereby contributing to the ongoing
tension that frequently clouds the relationship between
tribes and other political or corporate entities.
In this essay, I will examine the origin, rationale, and
consequences of several of these collective and individual
Indian statuses. I hope this analysis provides a better
understanding of these statuses and their continuing
impact on contemporary political and legal thought and
policy formulation. For purposes of simplicity, this paper
uses a chronological approach so that we may better
witness the ways in which definitions of Indian status
have changed and the ways in which they have persisted.
I. JOHN MARSHALL: THE GREAT
EQUIVOCATOR
It is impossible to address indigenous status without
invoking the name and jurisprudence of the third Chief
Justice, John Marshall. Countless books and articles have
examined his judicial opinions establishing certain
principles tribes have relied on and had to cope with since
their enunciation.3  These include the doctrine of
discovery,4 tribes as domestic-dependent nations
possessing a status resembling that of a guardian to a
ward,5 and tribes as distinct political communities with an
independence that states could not interfere with or
diminish because of the sanctity of treaties, tribal
sovereignty, and federal supremacy.6
In two of these opinions, Johnson v. McIntosh7 and
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia8, Marshall employed
equivocal and problematic language about the doctrines
of discovery and conquest and the status of tribes and
their members, creating a confusing set of principles that
still affects indigenous people. At the time of these
rulings, American Indians, including the Cherokee
Nation, enjoyed the status of de facto and de jure
sovereign nations. Tribes had existed for millennia as
national groups with bounded lands, defined populations,
and adaptive governing institutions. Diplomacy, as
carried out via the treaty process, had been the principle
manner through which European countries and the United
States had interacted with tribes.
Nevertheless, in both Johnson and Cherokee Nation,
Marshall openly manipulated indigenous status by trying
to provide some measure of recognition to Indian rights
while at the same time elevating the federal government
to a superior position in relation to tribes. Even though
tribes were de facto and de jure sovereign nations,
Marshall spoke of indigenous people not solely in terms
of their political or sovereign capacity but more broadly
as "Indians" in a conglomerate or class sense, or as a
"race" of people. Yet at other times he spoke of Indians
in an "individualized" sense.
9
These are three very different statuses under the
law-political, racial, and individual. Marshall and
subsequent courts and lawmakers ventured back and
forth, sometimes intentionally and sometimes unwittingly,
between these three statuses. These vacillations continue
to cause tremendous confusion among Indians, federal
lawmakers, and practitioners of Indian law.
Take the following excerpts from Johnson:
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* Political status recognized:
The plaintiffs [Johnson and Graham] in this
cause claim the lands ...by the chiefs of
certain Indian tribes, constituting the Illinois
and the Pinkish nations .... 10
* Racial status recognized:
In the establishment of these relations, the
rights of the original inhabitants [the Indians]
were, in no instance entirely disregarded; but
were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired.'
; Racial status recognized:
Thus has our whole country been granted by
the crown while in the occupation of the
Indians .... In all of them [the states], the soil,
at the time of the grants were made, was
occupied by the Indians.1
2
* Individual status recognized:
We know of no principle which can distinguish
this case from a grant made to a native Indian,
authorizing him to hold a particular tract of
land in severalty.
13
Marshall's next opinion, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,14 contained more status juggling. In this case
the Cherokee people, who had signed nearly a dozen
treaties with the federal government, approached the
Court as a sovereign political entity in an effort to get the
federal government to force the state of Georgia to stop
interfering in the internal affairs and territorial boundaries
of the Cherokee. But the Chief Justice once again
manipulated indigenous status to arrive at a compromise
ruling. This ruling reduced the sovereignty of the
Cherokee Nation in an effort to preserve the Court's
authority from presidential encroachment. Marshall set
this up by noting that "the relation of the Indians to the
United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal
distinctions which exist no where else."'
5
The only thing "peculiar" about the relationship was
that Marshall, for the United States, was claiming that
Indian territory was actually a part of the United States
despite a number of treaties which affirmed that Indian
lands were separate and not subject to federal jurisdiction
or ownership. In order to find federal jurisdiction over
tribes, while still according some recognition to Indian
rights, Marshall renewed his manipulation of indigenous
status, and in so doing further multiplied its categories:
* State status:
The acts of our government plainly recognize
the Cherokee nation as a State, and the courts
are bound by those acts.' 6
* Individual status:
The Indian territory is admitted to compose a
part of the United States . . . . In all our
intercourse with foreign nations, in our
commercial regulations, in any attempt at
intercourse between Indians and foreign
nations, they are considered as within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States,
subject to many of those restraints which are
imposed upon our own citizens.
17
* Political status:
'They acknowledge themselves in their treaties
to be under the protection of the United States
.... [A]nd the Cherokees in particular were
allowed by the treaty at Hopewell, which
preceded the Constitution, "to send a deputy of
their choice, whenever they think fit, to
Congress."' 8
* State status:
They [tribes] may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations.1 9
0 Dependency status:
Meanwhile the [tribes] are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.20
Within the space of a single page, Marshall had
reaffirmed the conflicting statuses outlined in Johnson
and added two additional and contradictory statuses: state
and dependency.
In a sense, the Court was only amplifying the
conflicting statuses of aboriginal people specified in the
United States Constitution. First, the Commerce Clause
declared that Congress has the power to "regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes. ' 21 This is an explicit
affirmation of the separate political status of tribes as
national bodies. By contrast, in Article 1, Section 2,
Clause 3 and the Fourteenth Amendment, there is
reference to "Indians not taxed," which identifies the
individual status of Indians who remained outside the
political jurisdiction of the United States and the states
for purposes of congressional representation.
This inherent tension, exacerbated by Justice
Marshall's opinions, has persisted between the national or
political status of tribes and the individual status of tribal
members. Later developments have only further muddied
the status of indigenous peoples in the United States.
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Frequently the Supreme Court used this confusion to
expand or constrain Indian rights, whichever they found
expedient at the time, or to affect the rights of other
minorities as compared to Indians.
II. JUSTICE TANEY AND THE "MANIFEST"
POWER OF THE COURT
Subsequent to Marshall's early rulings, federal Indian
policy and law sought to support western expansion and
land settlement while still acknowledging a variable
degree of indigenous sovereignty and native
proprietorship. Indian removal (1830s-1850s), the
establishment of Indian reservations (1850s-early 1900s),
and Indian assimilation and allotment (1860s-1920s) were
the dominant policy themes for the next century. During
this period, the United States treated indigenous peoples
brutally, attempting to diminish their lands, their cultures,
and their rights.
Indigenous status fluctuated depending on the tribe
(whether considered "civilized," like the Five Civilized
Tribes and the Pueblos, or "wild," like the Navajo, the
Sioux, and many others), the policy and philosophical
orientation of Congress and the Supreme Court, and the
political atmosphere of the country at the time. In 1846,
as western expansion quickened, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Rogers2 2 weighed in on aboriginal rights
by utterly denying tribes any national or political
standing. As Chief Justice Taney said, "The native tribes
who were found on this continent at the time of its
discovery have never been acknowledged or treated as
independent nations by the European governments, nor
regarded as the owners of the territories they respectively
occupied. 23
Taney then brought forth a strictly racial dimension
when he declared that "from the very moment the general
government came into existence to this time, it has
exercised its power over this unfortunate race in the spirit
of humanity and justice, and has endeavored by every
means in its power to enlighten their minds and increase
their comforts, and to save them if possible from the
consequences of their own vices." 24  The 1847
amendment to the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act with
Indian tribes, entitled An Act to Amend an Act entitled
'An Act to Provide for the Better Organization of the
Department of Indian Affairs,' continued this trend by the
federal government to treat Indians as a depraved race of
individuals.25 Section 3 of the amended act authorized the
President or the Secretary of War to pay monies due the
tribe not to the chiefs or their designates, but to "the
heads of families and other individuals entitled to
,26participate therein." This circumvention of tribal
leaders violated the nation-to-nation relationship
established in treaties and, in effect, gave the federal
authorities power to determine the membership of tribes
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at an individual level for the purpose of annuity
distribution. This was the first action by Congress to
individualize tribal funds and property in a way that
diminished the sovereign character of tribal nations.27
A little more than a decade later, in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,28 a case which held that African Americans had
no legal rights which whites had to respect and that blacks
could not become American citizens, Justice Taney
provided a more realistic account of tribal status. His
discussion of tribal status in Dred Scott dicta reveals
Taney's awareness of the facts about tribes that he had
conveniently chosen to ignore in Rogers. He said:
These Indian Governments were regarded and
treated as foreign governments, as much as if
an ocean had separated the red man from the
white .... Treaties have been negotiated with
them, and their alliance sought in war, and the
people who compose these Indian political
communities have always been treated as
foreigners not living under our Government. 29
When compared to Taney's views of Indians in Rogers,
this quote reveals the Chief Justice's disingenuousness in
employing absolutely opposite descriptions of tribal
status when it suited his political purpose.
III. A (PARTIAL) CLOSING OF THE DOOR:
LOSS OF TREATIES, LOSS OF STATUS?
As United States power waxed and indigenous power
continued to wane, by the 1860s federal lawmakers,
agitated by western states and territories, looked to
redefine indigenous status yet again. But before Congress
stepped in with its unilateral modification of the
diplomatic relationship, the Supreme Court handed down
two important rulings that, for the time, acted to meld the
Indians' national status as sovereign bodies with the
individual status of tribal members.
In United States v. Holliday,3 ° the Court held that
Congress had the power to regulate liquor sales to tribes
and their individual members wherever they lived, both
on and off the reservations. In exploring how
"commerce" with tribes included the liquor trade, the
Court said:
And so commerce with the Indian tribes,
means commerce with the individuals
composing those tribes . . . . The right to
exercise [the liquor trade] in reference to any
Indian tribe, or any person who is a member of
such tribe, is absolute, without reference to the
locality of the traffic, or the locality of the
tribe, or of the members of the tribe with
whom it is carried on.
3'
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Kansas Indians similarly mingled Indians' political
32and individual statuses. In that case, the Court used
powerful terminology to emphasize the national status of
the tribes and the respect that was to be accorded the
lands of even individually allotted Indians:
The treaty of 1854 left the Shawnee people a
united tribe, with a declaration of their
dependence on the National government for
protection and the vindication of their rights.
Ever since this their tribal organization has
remained as it was before. They have elective
chiefs and an elective council; meeting at
stated periods; keeping a record of their
proceedings; with powers regulated by custom;
by which they punish offenses, adjust
differences, and exercise a general oversight
over the affairs of the nation. This people have
their own customs and laws by which they are
governed. Because some of those customs
have been abandoned, owing to the proximity
of their white neighbors, may be an evidence
of the superior influence of our race, but does
not tend to prove that their tribal organization
is not preserved. There is no evidence in the
record to show that the Indians with separate
estates have not the same rights in the tribe as
those whose estates are held in common ....
While the general government has a
superintending care over their interests, and
continues to treat with them as a nation, the
State of Kansas is estopped from denying their
title to it .... Conferring rights and privileges
on these Indians cannot affect their situation,
which can only be changed by treaty
stipulation, or a voluntary abandonment of
their tribal organization. As long as the United
States recognizes their national character they
are under the protection of treaties and the
laws of Congress, and their property is
withdrawn from the operation of State laws.
33
Five years later, Congress explicitly rejected these
views of the Court. In March of 1871, via an Indian
Appropriation Act rider,34 Congress declared that
henceforth the United States would no longer negotiate
treaties with tribes, although it would honor all
preexisting ratified treaties. Formal agreements did
continue until 1912, but there was nevertheless a real
sense among many federal lawmakers and Supreme Court
justices that Congress had elevated itself to a superior
position from which to govern all Indians through acts of
Congress.
This reduction in both perceived and real tribal
sovereign status, however, was not always reflected in
subsequent Supreme Court cases. For example, in the
important Indian criminal law case, Exparte Crow Dog,
35
the Court reaffirmed the national status of tribes when it
held that:
[T]he pledge to secure to these [Lakota]
people, with whom the United States was
contracting as a distinct political body, an
orderly government, by appropriate legislation
thereafter to be framed and enacted,
necessarily implies, having regard to all the
circumstances attending the transaction, that
among the arts of civilized life, which it was
the very purpose of all these arrangements to
introduce and naturalize among them, was the
highest and best of all, that of self-government,
the regulation by themselves of their own
domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and
peace among their own members by the
administration of their own laws and
customs.
36
In this same decision, however, the Court discussed
Indians as being "wards," not as individuals belonging to
an American polity, "but as a dependent community who
were in a state of pupilage, advancing from the condition
of a savage tribe to that of a people who.., it was hoped
might become a self-supporting and self-governed
society.
' 37
The status of wardship would be most forcefully
enunciated in two major cases of that period, United
38 3
States v. Kagama and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.39
Kagama upheld the extension of federal criminal law
over all major crimes in Indian country. The decision
codified tribes not as nations or states but as "separate
peoples" with some internal powers of governance.
Nevertheless, tribes were seen as "wards of the nation" in
a wholly "dependent" relationship to their federal
guardians. In 1903, the Court in Lone Wolf enshrined
federal plenary power over tribes and their treaty
property. Lone Wolf reinforced the political question
doctrine by refusing to consider the Kiowa, Comanche,
and Apache tribes' arguments that they had been
defrauded in being forced to sell their lands to the federal
government. In the Court's words, the Indians'
contention that their lands were being taken in violation
of their treaty "ignores the status of the contracting
Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and
continue to bear toward the government of the United
States. 4 °
Ironically, between these two sovereignty crushing
cases, the Supreme Court in Talton v. Mayes4 '
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dramatically reaffirmed that although tribes were subject
to the stronger authority of the federal government, their
sovereign national status did not derive from and was
therefore not beholden to the United States Constitution.
The Court held that Cherokees' powers of self-
governance traced to a separate point of origin, the
Cherokee people, who did not owe their existence or
governmental structure to the United States
Constitution.42
IV. INDIANS AS CITIZENS
The Snyder Act43 in 1921 signaled an important
federal statutory change in indigenous status. Up to this
time, Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
expended monies for Indians largely on the basis of treaty
provisions or a specific law that addressed particular
tribes. This Act, however, granted a general authority to
the BIA under the Interior Department's supervision to
spend congressionally appropriated money "for the
benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the
United States."44 This money was to be used for a wide
variety of purposes, including health, education,
civilization, irrigation, and liquor control. This was the
first generic appropriation measure designed to meet the
tremendous socio-economic needs of Indians. The BIA
was not beholden to the language of specific treaties or
agreements in its allocations, nor was it restricted to
serving only reservation-based tribes.
The next major shift in United States governmental
actions towards indigenous groups arrived three years
later in 1924 with the Indian Citizenship Act.45 Through
that law, Congress completed the enfranchisement of
American Indian individuals as citizens of the United
States. This measure, titled "A Bill granting citizenship to
Indians, and for other purposes," bestowed United States
citizenship on all non-citizen Indians born in the United
States.46 Some Indian tribes, like the Six Nations
Confederacy of New York State, formally objected to this
act, declaring that the United States lacked authority to
impose its citizenship on tribal members who already
enjoyed citizenship in their own nations.
The Act, however, brought little clarity to the status
issue because it concluded with this problematic
statement: "Provided, that the granting of citizenship shall
not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of
any Indian to tribal or other property., 47 In other words,
federal citizenship did not supplant tribal citizenship.
The Act simply added a layer of American citizenship to
preexisting tribal citizenship. Importantly, tribal national
status was unaffected by this measure since only
individual Indians received the franchise. An earlier
Supreme Court case, United States v. Nice,48 involving an
enfranchised Indian allottee, had held as much when the
Court determined that "citizenship is not incompatible
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with tribal existence or continued guardianship, and so
may be conferred without completely emancipating the
Indian or placing them beyond the reach of congressional
regulations adopted for their protection. 49
This layering of federal citizenship status onto tribal
citizenship, later supplemented by various state laws
which accorded Indians the right to vote, has proven most
troubling for Indians. On the one hand, individual
Indians are entitled to exercise their right to vote in
federal elections under the Fifteenth Amendment. On the
other hand, individual Indians are not guaranteed
Fourteenth Amendment protection from their own tribal
governments, if the tribal government is acting within its
sovereign capacity, as held in Groundhog v. Keeler.
50
V. TRIBES AS CORPORATE BODIES
Congress enacted two important laws in 1934 that
signaled yet another dramatic shift in indigenous status.
The Johnson-O'Malley Act5 ' (JOM) increased the role of
state governments in administering aid to Indians as
individuals, now also recognized as state citizens. The
Indian Reorganization Act52 (IRA) sought to revitalize
tribal nations as unique cultural, geographic, economic,
and legal polities.
JOM authorized the Secretary of Interior to enter into
contracts with states to provide education, health,
agricultural aid, relief of distress, and social welfare
assistance for individual Indians at Congress' expense.
Some of these appropriations were designed to
accommodate the unmet financial needs of school
districts with large areas of non-taxable Indian-owned
property and increasing numbers of Indian children. JOM
was amended in 1936 to allow political sub-units of
states-counties, municipalities, state universities and
colleges, and appropriate state or private corporations-
to expend federal dollars on behalf of Indians.53
IRA, enacted two months after JOM, had a much
more comprehensive and collective focus. It was
designed to counteract the ravages of the Indian allotment
era and the harsh, coercive assimilative tactics of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs since the 1880s. IRA had a
number of overt objectives: stop the loss of tribal and
individual lands; provide for the acquisition of new lands
for tribes; establish a system of financial credit; and
implement an Indian preference policy. It also sought to
stabilize tribes politically by authorizing them to organize
and adopt a constitutional form of government, write by-
laws, hire counsel, and prevent the sale of tribal lands. In
a move that has divided further the status of Indian groups
in federal law, IRA established a new definition of
"federally-recognized" tribes by declaring that the Act's
provisions, should a tribe vote to adopt the measure,
would apply to "all persons of Indian descent who are
members of any recognized tribe now under Federal
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jurisdiction. 54 In other words, any member of a "tribe,
organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one
reservation," regardless of blood quantum and with whom
the United States had an established government-to-
government relationship, was eligible for the Act's
provisions. This provision problematically dichotomized
Indian Country into two broad and contentious camps:
federally recognized tribes and non-recognized tribes.
For our purposes, however, Section 17 of IRA holds
special interest. This section, for the first time in a
general manner, bestowed upon tribes a status in law as a
corporate body. Section 17 reads in part:
The Secretary of the Interior may, upon
petition.., issue a charter of incorporation to
such tribes: Provided, That such charter shall
not become operative until ratified .... Such
charter may convey to the incorporated tribe
the power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest,
or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and
dispose of property of every description, real
and personal . . . and such further powers as
may be included to the conduct of corporate
business, not inconsistent with laws .... 5
Although Section 17 was the first national legislation
on the subject of tribal corporate status, the Pueblos of
New Mexico had previously been incorporated under
territorial legislation in 1851.56 Moreover, tribes qua
tribes were already defacto corporate bodies in a general
political sense despite the fact that neither had a charter of
incorporation.57  This is because the concept of
"corporation" can be defined as a group of individuals "to
which the law ascribes legal personality, i.e., the complex
of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities enjoyed by
natural persons generally."
58
In effect, corporate status for tribes, especially when
it extends from an explicit law like the IRA or the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act,59 vests in indigenous
polities additional powers above those they already hold
as separate political bodies. These include the right to
sue, the capacity to hold and exercise property rights, and
the power to execute contracts.
A vital question for such federally incorporated tribes
or Alaska Native entities remains: Does such
incorporation make the indigenous polity an
instrumentality of the federal government? Not
surprisingly, there is conflicting evidence on this
question. In some cases, it has been held that tribes in
their relationship to states and municipal governments
will be treated as federal instrumentalities. For example,
a solicitor's opinion in 1934 declared that "the granting of
a Federal corporate charter to an Indian tribe confirms the
character of such a tribe as a Federal instrumentality and
agency. 60 On the other hand, tribes as preexisting
sovereigns have also been held not to be federal
instrumentalities within the meaning of federal statutes
subjecting tribal officers to federal embezzlement laws.
And as Talton v. Mayes61 held, tribes are not subject to
constitutional restrictions under the Fifth Amendment.
VI. TERMINATION AND ITS AFTERMATH
The termination policy, inaugurated in 1953 by
House Concurrent Resolution 83-108, savaged the
collective sovereign/national character of a number of
indigenous polities legislatively. It severed the trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian
tribes, both ending federal benefits and support services
and dissolving the reservation status of tribal lands. The
intention of the law was to expedite the assimilation of
those American Indians deemed economically self-
sufficient by terminating their political status and
subjecting the terminated tribes and their members to
state law and jurisdiction.
This policy and the accompanying relocation
program that sent thousands of reservation Indians to
major urban areas arose in the activist environment of the
1960s. The chain of events resulting from this era's
activism, especially the civil rights movement, revived
old indigenous nations' statuses and created new ones that
have continuing effect today. These included: tribes as
"discrete and insular" minorities that require special
protection from discrimination; tribes as dependent and
geographically incorporated communities; tribes as
"states" for purposes of federal legislation in the shifting
arrangement of federalism; and tribes as poverty-stricken
groups deserving of federal assistance not because of
their distinctive treaty or political status but because of
their American citizenship and low socio-economic
status. Importantly, these statuses did not supplant the
preexisting statuses; they simply were added on, making
an already convoluted situation even more confusing.
62
A. DISCRETE AND INSULAR STATUS
America's major racial and ethnic minorities, African
Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and American
Indians, and the largest subordinated group, women,
stepped forward in dramatic fashion in the 1960s to gain
civil rights, exert cultural pride, seek equal protection
under the law, and acquire educational opportunities long
denied them. While American Indians were not
particularly active in the early days of the civil rights
movement, they did engage in some of the same strategies
adopted by other groups to gain attention for their rights:
fish-ins, marches, and demonstrations.
The phrase "discrete and insular minorities," which
includes religious, national, and racial minorities, first
appeared in a footnote in the 1938 case, United States v.
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Carolene Products Company.63 It is often interpreted as
having established the modem court's equal protection
analysis. This case upheld the federal government's
power to ban the shipment of skim milk mixed with fat or
other non-milk products in interstate commerce. Justice
Stone, while reaffirming that heightened scrutiny would
no longer be given to laws regulating economic activities,
noted that heightened scrutiny might still be given to
legislation affecting fundamental rights or legislation
which singled out "discrete and insular minorities."
64
The Civil Rights Act of 196465 (forbidding racial
discrimination in public accommodations), the Voting
Rights Act of 196566 (banning racial discrimination in
elections), and the Civil Rights Act of 196867 (forbidding
discrimination in the sale, rental, financing, or advertising
of housing) brought additional rights and opportunities to
Indian peoples and their members, largely because of
their status as historically underprivileged and
discriminated against minority groups. Although tribal
political status was not completely ignored, it was largely
obscured by the Indians' minority status. The Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968,68 however, which bestowed
modified provisions of the Bill of Rights on the activities
of tribal governments vis-a-vis reservation residents, both
provides equal protection and civil liberties to individuals
in their dealings with tribal governments and deals
explicitly with the national status of tribes.
B. DEPENDENT AND GEOGRAPHICAL INCORPORATED
STATUS
In Oliphant v. Suquamish,69 holding that tribes
lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Justice
Rehnquist accepted the lower courts' assessment that
tribes, as sovereign polities, could not exercise any power
that Congress had not formally granted, and could not
wield powers that were deemed "inconsistent with their
status., 70 But what was the tribal "status" referred to by
the appellate court and reiterated by Rehnquist? It was
that of a dependent "quasi-sovereign" polity made subject
to the dominant federal sovereign by its geographical
incorporation into the United States territorial boundaries.
Furthermore, this status, in order to be upheld, had to
find support in an express "affirmative delegation" by
some Congressional action. It was a dependent and
delegated status based on a strange geographical
phenomenon known as incorporation. It is strange in the
factual sense that Indian tribes actually geographically
"incorporated" the various European settlements and the
United States, since tribes were the prior territorial
sovereign. Thus, any literal understanding of geographic
incorporation should actually support indigenous
authority over all non-Indians who entered their lands,
unless there can be found explicit evidence that the tribes
surrendered such power via treaty or conquest.
C. STATE STATUS
After Congress enacted the 1975 Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act,7' tribal
govemments began to press Congress and the BIA for a
greater role in administering their own health,
educational, law enforcement, and social welfare affairs.
In two key areas, taxation and environmental regulation,
tribes were accorded a new status, "treatment as states"
(TAS), under federal law. The Indian Tribal
Governmental Tax Status Act 72 declared that:
An Indian tribal government shall be treated as
a State (1) for purposes of determining whether
and in what amount any contribution or
transfer to or for the use of such government
(or a political subdivision thereof) is
deductible under ... (A) Section 170 (relating
to income tax deduction for charitable, etc.,
contributions and gifts) ....
In short, Congress meant this Act to provide tribal
governments with a number of the benefits under the
Internal Revenue Code that states and local governments
had been receiving. For example, the IRS no longer
taxed interest paid on tribal government debt obligations,
consistent with its treatment of states.74
In the equally critical area of environmental policy,
tribes also garnered TAS status from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Congress. They used this
status to aid their efforts to rectify the host of
environmental problems their peoples and lands face,
including air and water pollution, waste disposal, and
pesticide poisoning. The Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1986, 75 the Clean Water ActAmendments of 1987,76 and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 199077 each contain specific TAS
provisions that allow tribal governments to establish their
own environmental protection institutions and policies to
enforce both federal and tribal standards. Other acts,
such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act78 (the "Superfund" law)
and the Surface Mining Reclamation Act,79 recognize
tribal interests and allow for some delegated authority to
tribes without specifically acknowledging their status as
"states." The only major environmental statute that lacks
a TAS or comparable provision is the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act,80 a law dealing with
solid waste disposal.8'
According to the language of the 1986 Safe Drinking
Water Act Amendments, in order for a tribe to receive
TAS consideration, it must show: 1) it is a federally-
recognized entity with a governing body capable of
carrying out governmental duties; 2) it has jurisdictional
authority to carry out the functions required of the act;
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and 3) the tribe is capable "in the Administrative
judgment" of carrying out the terms and purposes of the
regulations.8 2
Assuming a tribal government can meet these
criteria, when the EPA acts to turn over regulation of
these environmental resources to the tribe, is it
"devolving" this power to the tribe or merely "delegating"
such authority? This question, raised by Richard
Monette, returns us to the question of whether tribes are
inherent sovereigns or merely federal instrumentalities.8 3
Devolution suggests that the program or issue at stake is
being returned to tribes who held original power;
delegation, by contrast, indicates that tribes are without
any independent authority over the subject matter and are
acting as arms or instrumentalities of the federal
government.
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D. Socio-ECONOMIC/POVERTY STATUS
While each of the statuses discussed above were
important, their combined impact on tribes and Indians
has been less significant than the shift in Indian status that
began in the 1960s when tribes were made eligible for a
number of social programs. These programs aimed not at
Indians as tribal polities with whom the federal
government had specific treaty or trust obligations, or as
racial/ethnic minorities suffering discrimination, but
rather as poverty-stricken human communities and
individuals eligible for general legislative support
because of their United States and state citizenship.
The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961,85 the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,86 and the Great
Society social welfare programs enabled tribes, as
essentially sub-divisions of the federal establishment, to
become direct sponsors of these and other federal
programs. These were the first instances in which tribal
governments, as sponsoring agencies, received money
that was not directed to them by the BIA. For the first
time since the late 1800s tribes could, to a limited degree,
establish their own priorities and mete out federal funds
with at least a modicum of flexibility.
To be eligible for these specific federal programs, the
tribes, as governing bodies, had to assure the funding
agency that they would administer the funds impartially
and without regard to race, ethnicity, or gender. Tribal
agencies, therefore, were now required to provide
programmatic assistance to any reservation resident who
otherwise met the program's eligibility criteria. For
example, when Congress established Navajo Community
College as the first tribally-controlled college in the
nation, the school was required, in receiving federal
education dollars, to establish a non-discrimination policy
which currently reads: 'Dine College [the school changed
its name in the 1990s] does not discriminate on the basis
of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, or
disability . . . . Equal opportunity for employment and
admission shall be extended to all persons, which is
promoted by the College through a positive and
continuous affirmative action program." 87
An interesting feature of this non-discrimination
policy is that it also declared that the college would
comply with the Navajo Preference in Employment Act
88
that provides hiring preferences for Navajos over equally
qualified non-Navajos. Here we see equal opportunity
and non-discrimination situated alongside Indian
preference, at best an uneasy linkage of two very different
policies.
Along with Indian preference, tribal nations, as
polities, also enjoy sovereign immunity and cannot
generally be sued without their express consent.89 As was
recently held in Bassett v. Mashantucket-Pequot Tribe,
90
a case involving copyright infringement and breach of
contract, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity barred
Bassett's copyright claims against the Pequot Tribe since
neither the tribe nor Congress under the Copyright Act
waived the sovereign immunity of the tribe. Therefore,
the principles of equal opportunity, due process, and non-
discrimination that tribes must adhere to as recipients of
federal services at times fundamentally clash with tribes'
inherent sovereign powers to enact racial preferences and
to immunize themselves from lawsuits.
The recurring question of whether tribes are arms of
the federal government or separate sovereigns resurfaced
in the 1960s and was further confused by judicial activity
in the 1970s. In Colliflower v. Garland,91 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that "in spite of the theory
that for some purposes an Indian tribe is an independent
sovereignty, we think that, in the light of their history, it is
pure fiction to say that the Indian courts functioning in the
Fort Belknap Indian community are not in part, at least,
arms of the federal government."
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Conversely, in 1978, the Supreme Court held in
United States v. Wheeler,93 a case involving the
application of the double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the actions of the Navajo Nation, that the
tribe had inherent authority to try one of its own members
since Navajo self-government was not "delegated federal
sovereignty." 94 Thus, there was no double jeopardy since
Wheeler had been prosecuted by two different
sovereigns-the Navajo Nation and the United States.
VII. INDIGENOUS STATUS IN THE SELF-
DETERMINATION ERA
The Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 197595 sought to wipe away the bitter
memory of the termination era by strengthening tribal
self-governance while at the same time reinforcing the
trust relationship. It authorized the Secretaries of the
Interior, and Health, Education, and Welfare to contract
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with tribal organizations for tribal operations and the
administration of specified federally funded programs.
These programs were previously administered directly by
these agencies. By the Act's very structure and the way it
set up the contracting process, tribes, in effect, were made
"a part of the executive branch as far as these programs
were concerned. 96 In other words, even as the federal
government purported to support greater tribal self-
determination, in reality the self-determination measure
effectively drew the tribes closer to being
instrumentalities of the executive branch.
The question as to whether tribes are political or
racial entities also reemerged in the 1970s. In a 1974
case Morton v. Mancari,97 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the political status of tribes when it was called on to
interpret the constitutionality of the BIA's Indian
preference policy. In holding that the BIA's hiring
preference did not constitute racial discrimination, the
Court reasoned that "It is not even a 'racial' preference.
Rather it is an employment criterion reasonably designed
to further the cause of Indian self-government .... " "In
this sense," said Justice Blackmun, "the preference is
political rather than racial in nature."
98
This ruling was recently reaffirmed in Rice v.
Cayetano,99 a case involving the status of Hawaiian
Natives. The attorney for Cayetano, Hawaii's Governor,
sought to have the trust relationship and the Mancari
theory of indigenous political status applied broadly to
Hawaiian Natives and narrowly to the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, the state agency which administers programs for
Hawaiian Natives. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, refused to accept these arguments and went to
great lengths to distinguish the status of Hawaiian Natives
from American Indians. Kennedy reiterated that the
Mancari doctrine applied only to "federally recognized
tribes" who exist as "quasi-sovereign" entities. Hawaiian
Natives, said Kennedy, lack such status. Furthermore, the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), the state agency
established to administer the lands of Hawaii's aboriginal
people, did not qualify as an independent entity.
The Court concluded that:
[While the] Office of Hawaiian Affairs has a
unique position under state law, it is just as
apparent that it remains an arm of the State...
the elections for OHA trustees are elections of
the State, not of a separate quasi-sovereign,
and they are elections to which the Fifteenth
Amendment apply. To extend Mancari to this
context would be to permit a State, by racial
classification, to fence out whole classes of its
citizens from decisionmaking in critical state
affairs.' °°
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One of the most important elements of the Mancari
ruling, cited positively by both Kennedy and Stevens
(joined by Ginsburg) in dissent, was the notion that
federal legislation singling out indigenous people will be
upheld as "long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique
obligation towards the Indians .... 101 Here we see the
generic word "Indians" figuring prominently into the
Court's calculus, not as specific tribes, and certainly not
as Hawaiian Natives. Kennedy and the majority
construed the term "Indians" only to mean "federally-
recognized" American Indian tribes who were entitled to
trust status and protections. Stevens and Ginsburg, in
dissent, interpreted the word more broadly. They defined
"Indian" to include Hawaiian Natives who should have
been entitled to trust status because of their colonial
treatment at the hands of the United States and the so-
called "guardian-ward" relationship that ensued in the
wake of their colonial relationship with the United States.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When Europeans first encountered indigenous
nations in what is now the United States, they found that
tribes exhibited de facto sovereignty and held varying
forms of proprietorship over their lands. The subsequent
treaties and agreements negotiated between tribes and the
various European and American powers, specific
congressional laws and general congressional policies,
Supreme Court cases, and the various administrative rules
and regulations developed by the Department of the
Interior and the BIA have merged this clear treatment of
Indians with a litany of indigenous collective and
individual statuses that cause great confusion for
aboriginal people, federal and state lawmakers, and the
American public.
Congress should act to clarify the status of Native
Americans within the United States. First, it should
restore to the President his Indian treaty-making
authority, which it problematically stripped in 1871. This
would reaffirm that there is indeed, as tribes have been
inconsistently told throughout history, a nation-to-nation
or government-to-government relationship between tribes
and the United States. Since the Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect the sovereignty of tribes, the formal act
of treaty negotiation is the only real device that can
provide tribal nations a measure of protection while at the
same time affirming their distinctive political relationship
with the United States.
Congress should then act under its plenary, exclusive
commerce power to clarify what rights indigenous nations
and their members possess and may exercise under
treaties, trust, and statutory law based on their sovereign
national status (e.g., tax exempt status, rights to hunt and
fish, sovereign immunity protections, and racial
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preferences). It should also clarify what rights indigenous
nations and their members possess and may exercise
under their status as federal and state citizens or as sub-
unit governments (e.g., funds for highways, social
services, unemployment compensation, and the right to
contract to run certain programs).
Finally, Congress should clarify its own
responsibilities in the field of Indian affairs. When tribes
are statutorily accorded a status as "corporations" or are
"treated as states" for purposes of environmental or tax
laws, are these political statuses that trace back to their
aboriginal status as preexisting sovereigns? Or are they
merely devolutions of federal power to the tribes which,
for purposes of the statute, act as federal instrumentalities
or as arms of the federal government? This strikes at the
heart of one of the most important questions that the law
must address: Are tribes inherent sovereigns acting as
policy partners with the United States and the States, or
are tribes units of government entitled to exercise only
those powers expressly delegated to them by the
Congress? Until this fundamental question is clarified,
the multitude of statuses indigenous peoples have held
both collectively and individually-whether possessed
inherently (tribes as preexisting sovereign entities),
unilaterally laid on them by federal decree (tribes as
dependent entities), or actively pursued by tribes to
improve their governing capabilities (TAS status)-will
continue to proliferate. With the further blending and
manipulation of these statuses, we can only expect
confusion and tension to reign supreme in Indian
relations.
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